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BUTrr IN: 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF CIGARETTE
ADVERTISNG AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH1
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996)
Brenda Currie2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, handed down on May 13, 1996, settled many questions concerning the
standard of First Amendment protection given commercial speech? At the same
time, the decision created concerns that the Supreme Court's increased willing-
ness to provide First Amendment protections to commercial speech would apply
across the board-even to cigarette advertisements.
The First Amendment vigorously protects "pure speech," but the degree to
which the First Amendment protects "commercial speech" has fluctuated. In the
early part of this century, speech that contained any "commercial" undertones
was denied First Amendment protection.' Since that time, the standard of protec-
tion has evolved to the point where "pure commercial speech" is allowed some
protection under the First Amendment.' Indeed, while truthful, nonmisleading,
commercial speech has not yet been given absolute protection by the First
Amendment, 44 Liquormart, Inc. can be read to suggest that the Supreme Court
is moving in that direction.
Over the last few decades, commercial speech has been given "mid-level" First
Amendment review.6 Until 44 Liquormart, Inc., the Court has seemingly allowed
this "mid-level" review to be somewhat flexible-to be used with varying levels
of specificity dependent upon the outcome sought to be achieved.7 The leeway in
the standard of protection afforded commercial speech led to its abuse.
Commercial speech has been the target of regulations seeking to reach paternal-
istic goals.
1. Daniel Helberg wrote an article entitled Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA s Proposed Restrictions on
Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1219 (1996). His article
discusses recent proposals that he felt would eventually completely ban tobacco advertising. This Casenote, on
the other hand, demonstrates that 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island may have "saved" these advertisments from
such fate-hence the title "Butt In."
2. I would like to thank Professor Matthew Steffey for his patience, supervision, and advice throughout the
development of this Casenote. I would also like to thank Professor Angela Kupenda for her excellent instruc-
tion in her First Amendment class.
3. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
4. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX.
L. REv. 747 (1993); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382
(1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
5. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1495.
6. See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
7. See generally id; Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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The Supreme Court "tightened-up" the test to be used for commercial speech
protection in 44 Liquormart, Inc.' The Court left no room for purely paternalis-
tic restrictions on commercial speech.' This leaves us to wonder if the Supreme
Court will continue to apply stricter standards or create some exceptions when it
is confronted with the constitutionality of the abundant bans on cigarette adver-
tising.
II. FACTS
In 1991, a Rhode Island corporation, 44 Liquormart, Inc., ran what turned out
to be a controversial advertisement in a Rhode Island daily newspaper." The
advertisement was headed "Thanksgiving Harvest" and displayed bottles of
brand named liquors."1 It advertised the price of snack foods, cigarettes, and
mixers. The advertisement noted that advertising the price of liquor violated
state law and, instead of prices, placed "WOW" next to pictures of vodka and
rum bottles.12
At the time the advertisement was published, the state of Rhode Island had two
statutes prohibiting the advertising of the retail price of alcoholic beverages.
Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-7 prohibited the "'advertising in any
manner whatsoever' the price of any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the
State; the only exception is for price tags or signs displayed with the merchandise
within licensed premises and not visible from the street."13 The other statute,
Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-8.1, prohibited the "publication or broad-
cast of any advertisements--even those referring to sales in other States-that
'make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages."'1 4
8. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1495.
9. Id.
10. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 E Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993).
11. Id.
12. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
13. Id. at 1501. Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-7 (1987) states:
Advertising price of malt beverages, cordials, wine or distilled liquor-No manufacturer, whole-
saler, or shipper from without this state and no holder of license issued under the provisions of this
title and chapter shall cause or permit the advertising in any manner whatsoever of the price of any
malt beverage, cordials, wine or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that
the provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or tags attached to or placed on merchan-
dise for sale within the licensed premises in accordance with rules and regulations of the depart-
ment. Regulation 32 of the Rules and Regulations of the Liquor Control Administrator provides that
no placard or sign that is visible from the exterior of a package store may make any reference to the
price of any alcoholic beverage.
Id. at n.2 (citing App. 2 to Brief for Petitioners).
14. Id. at 1501. Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-8.1 (1987) states:
Price advertising by media or advertising companies unlawful-No newspaper, periodical, radio or
television broadcaster or broadcasting company or any other person, firm or corporation with a prin-
cipal place of business in the state of Rhode Island which is engaged in the business of advertising
or selling advertising time or space shall accept, publish, or broadcast any advertisement in this state
of the price or make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages. Any person who shall violate
any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.... The statute authorizes the
liquor control administrator to exempt trade journals from its coverage.
Id. at n.3 (citing App. 2 to Brief for Petitioners).
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Soon after 44 Liquormart, Inc. ran their advertisement, competitors com-
plained to the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator. '5 These complaints
led to an enforcement hearing that took place in December of 1991. The Liquor
Control Administrator for Rhode Island concluded that 44 Liquormart, Inc. vio-
lated Rhode Island General Laws section 3-8-7 and Liquor Control Administration
Regulation 32, fined them $400, and ordered that the advertisement cease."6 44
Liquormart, Inc. paid their fine and did not appeal the administrator's decision. 7
People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc. is a licensed retailer of alcoholic beverages
who extensively used price advertising in Massachusetts.18 On several occasions,
they had attempted to place advertisements including information about prices in
Rhode Island newspapers, but they were consistently refused due to Rhode
Island General Laws section 3-8-8.1 19 44 Liquormart, Inc. and People's joined
as plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of Rhode Island's two prohibitions
against advertising the price of alcoholic beverages; they asserted that the two
statutes violated the First Amendment.0
III. HISTORY OF APPLICABLE LAW
A. The First Amendment and Commercial Speech
The First Amendment was adopted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. 21 It
states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. 22 It was not until the late 1920's or the
early 1930's that the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the First
Amendment applied not only to the federal government, but also to state and
local governments.23 Since incorporation, commercial speech has sparked great
dispute. Is advertising speech? Is commercial speech given any protection by
the First Amendment? What level of scrutiny will apply to commercial speech?
Should truthful, non-deceptive commercial speech be treated differently from
other speech?
Protection afforded commercial speech by the First Amendment was quite hazy
during the early part of this century.2' Advertising was not viewed as a form of
15. Id. at 1503.
16. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993).
17. Id.
18. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
19. 44 Liquor Mart, 829 F Supp. at 545.
20. Id. at 544-45.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. Id.
23. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 4. See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24. See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 4.
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expression or speech-but as business.25 Indeed, the Court's 1942 decision in
Valentine v. Chrestensen seemed to make commercial advertising an exception to
the protections given speech by the First Amendment. In this case and cases
that followed, restrictions were allowed to stand on all speech that was in some
respect "commercial"-even if "advertising" was not the entire or even dominant
theme. In Valentine, a New York statute prohibited the distribution of any "hand-
bill . . . or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street."27 The
Court upheld the statute and explained that the First Amendment did not allow
the banning of all handbill communication, but it did allow the banning of hand-
bills that contained aspects of "commercial advertising. 28
Likewise, in Breard v. Alexandria, decided in 1951, commercial speech was
not given First Amendment protection. 29 The defendant was convicted for the
violation of an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation of magazine
subscriptions. The Court upheld the conviction due to the "commercial fea-
ture" of the transaction. 1 Breard is, however, the last case in which the Court
denied protection under the First Amendment without finding that the speech
was "purely commercial."
Following Breard, the Court began to take steps in the direction of recognizing
First Amendment protections for speech, even if the speech had "commercial"
aspects. However, the Court did not yet acknowledge protections for "pure com-
mercial speech." In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations, the Court upheld an ordinance which restricted the advertising of
"sex-designated columns of advertisements for non-exempt job opportunities. ' 32
The Court emphasized that their decision hinged on the fact that the activity was
illegal; otherwise the advertisements would have received some degree of First
Amendment protection.3 Following Pittsburgh Press Co., the Court actually
gave First Amendment protection to an advertisement in Bigelow v. Virginia, but
it made clear that there was an element of public concern involved and not just
"pure commercial speech. '3' At the time Bigelow was decided, abortion was the
subject of increasing debate.3 ' A Virginia statute made an advertisement that
"encourage[d] or prompt[ed] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage" a misde-
25. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467
(1911). There are cases as early as 1877 that recognized advertising to be speech and entitled to at least some
First Amendment protections. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). But, there are still other cases decid-
ed during that time that suggest advertising was beyond First Amendment protection. See Lewis Pub. Co. v.
Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 4, at 765-66.
26. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
30. Id. at 622-23.
31. Id. at 642.
32. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
33. Id. at 388-89.
34. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975).
35. Id. See generally Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA 's Proposed Restrictions on
Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1219, 1244 (1996).
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meanor 6 An advertisement was published in the Virginia Weekly which
informed readers that abortions were legal in New York, explained that residency
was not a requirement, and instructed interested readers to contact a particular
clinic.37 While finding the statute in violation of the First Amendment, the Court
held that the advertisement "contained factual material of clear 'public interest"'
and not just pure commercial speech.'
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
the Court finally recognized that even "pure commercial speech" should be given
some First Amendment protection. 9 The Court held invalid a Virginia statute
which made "publish[ing], advertis[ing], or promot[ing], directly or indirectly, in
any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or
credit terms ... for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription" a
violation of professional conduct.0 The Court refused to require the pharmacist
to add a "public interest element" so that their advertisements would not be "pure
commercial speech"-therefore eligible for First Amendment protection.41 The
Court instead revealed that the Board's justifications for this requirement were
based on the State's attempt to protect its citizens by keeping them ignorant. 2
The Court said that the statute "affects [citizens] only through the reactions it is
assumed [they] will have to the free flow of drug price information."43 The Court
held that there was
an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume
that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.44
In that same opinion, the Court clarified it was not holding that commercial
speech could never be regulated and noted that untruthful commercial speech
had never been protected.4" Further, the Court justified its finding by recogniz-
ing that commercial speech is more "verifiable than ... news reporting or politi-
cal commentary."46 The Court determined that "the greater objectivity and hardi-
ness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate
statements. '"4
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, the Court continued to define the protections given commercial speech and
set out a four-part test to determine if regulations on commercial speech violate
36. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13.
37. Id. at 812.
38. Id. at 822.
39. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
40. Id. at 750.
41. Id. at 764-65.
42. Id. at 768-69.
43. Id. at 769.
44. Id. at 770.
45. Id. at 771.
46. Id. at 772, n.24.
47. Id.
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the First Amendment. '8 The test required: (1) the speech "concern lawful activi-
ty and not be misleading"; (2) the government assert a "substantial interest" in
restricting the speech; (3) the government must demonstrate that its regulation
"directly advances" the interest it asserts; and (4) the regulation must not be
"more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. ' 9
Due to lack of energy supply, the state of New York banned all advertising that
promoted the use of electricity."0 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
challenged the ban on First Amendment grounds."1 Applying this new test, the
Court found: (1) the speech concerned lawful activity and was not deceptive or
misleading; (2) the State had substantial interests in conserving energy and in
making sure rates were fair and efficient; (3) "the link between the advertising
prohibition and [interest in assuring fair rates was], at most, tenuous," but a
direct link existed between the prohibition and the State's interest in conserva-
tion; and (4) the statute was more extensive than necessary in that it "reach[ed]
all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on
overall energy use." 2 Though the statute passed prongs one, two, and three, the
Court said that "[i]n the absence of a showing that more limited speech regula-
tion would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central
Hudson's advertising."
The Court, however, in Posadas De Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, weakened prong four of the Central Hudson test by
allowing more deference to legislatures in deciding which types of regulations
could be used to further the State's interest.5 4 Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion for the Court.5" A Puerto Rico regulation prohibited advertisements of
casino gambling addressed to the residents of Puerto Rico but allowed advertise-
ments directed toward tourists. 6 The Court applied the test set out in Central
Hudson.57 After finding the speech concerned lawful activity and was not mis-
leading or fraudulent, the Court found that Puerto Rico's legislature had a "sub-
stantial interest" in protecting their citizens from the evils of gambling. 8 The
Court also found that the regulation "directly advanced" this interest.5 9 Further,
the Court held that even though there might be other ways to satisfy Puerto
Rico's interest which would not suppress commercial speech, "it [was] up to the
legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as
effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertis-
ing."6 In applying the fourth prong, the Court diverged from the stricter stan-
48. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 558-59.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 566-70.
53. Id. at 571.
54. Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of PR., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 335-36.
57. Id. at 340-44.
58. Id. at 341.
59. Id. at 341-42.
60. Id. at 344.
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dard of Central Hudson which required proof that a lesser restriction would not
be effective. The Court instead allowed greater deference to the legislature. 1
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court applied the Central Hudson test
more rigorously than it had in Pasodas2 It found that section 5(e)(2) of the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 failed Central Hudson's standards.6
The statute prohibited the displaying of alcohol content on beer labels. 4 Both
the parties and the Court agreed that the speech was "truthful, verifiable and
nonmisleading" information concerning beer's alcohol content-satisfying prong
one of the test set out in Central Hudson.65 The government asserted that its
"substantial interest" was to "advance Congress' goal of curbing 'strength wars'
by beer brewers who might seek to compete for customers on the basis of alcohol
content. '66 The Court found that "the goal of suppressing strength wars consti-
tuted a substantial interest," therefore, the second prong of Central Hudson was
satisfied.67 The Court then moved into its analysis of the last two prongs of
Central Hudson.
In analyzing whether the stated governmental interest was "directly advanced"
by the restrictions and whether they were "no more extensive than necessary," the
Court recalled its analysis two terms prior in Edenfield v. Fane.'
In Edenfield, we decided that the Government carries the burden of showing
that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest "in a direct
and material way." That burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation and con-
jecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commer-
cial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."69
The Court found that the statute did not "directly" or "materially" advance the
Government's interest.70 It found that alcohol content was prohibited on labels
but was not prohibited in advertising to the same degree.71 It also found that
alcohol content was actually required on "malt liquors. '72 The Court said, "The
failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising, which would
seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than labels,
makes no rational sense if the government's true aim is to suppress strength
wars."73 The Court found convincing the respondent's argument that the regula-
61. Id.
62. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). See Posadas, 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
63. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 476.
64. Id. at 476-477.
65. Id. at 483.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 485.
68. Id. at 485-486; Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
69. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 487-488.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 488.
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tion was "more extensive than necessary" in satisfying its goal.7 ' They suggested
"directly limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts
emphasizing high alcohol strength,... or limiting the labeling ban only to malt
liquors, which is the segment of the market that allegedly is threatened with a
strength war" as alternative means to satisfy the government's interest." The
Court accordingly found that the statute failed to meet Central Hudson and thus
violated the First Amendment.76
B. Twenty-first Amendment and Commercial Speech
At times, the type of product or activity that is being advertised generates an
assortment of arguments which attempt to justify the states' power to restrict
commercial speech. Two common positions asserted are the "vice" argument
and the "greater includes the lesser" argument. The "vice" argument has been
asserted when products such as alcoholic beverages or conduct such as gambling
are being advertised. The argument is that these things are "inherently bad;"
therefore, the government should have broader regulatory power-even if it
includes restricting speech. The similar "greater includes the lesser" rationale
was first expressed as early as 1939 in Ziffrin v. Reeves.77 The Court held that the
"greater power" to prohibit includes the "lesser power" to extensively regulate.78
When regulations are directed at speech that relates to alcoholic beverages,
another argument is sometimes asserted. It is argued that the Twenty-first
Amendment should justify such restraints. The Eighteenth Amendment, which
was adopted in 1919, prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
liquor.79 The Twenty-first Amendment, adopted in 1933, in Section 1 repealed
the Eighteenth Amendment and in Section 2 expressly granted regulatory power
over intoxicating liquors to the states.8" Because the Twenty-first Amendment is
the only express grant of power given to the states, there has been some argument
as to its role in conjunction with other amendments-in particular, the First
Amendment.8 The "vice" argument, the "greater includes the lesser" rationale,
74. Id. at 489-90.
75. Id. at 489.
76. Id. at 490.
77. Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
78. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 433 N.E.2d 138, 141(Ohio 1982) (citing Ziffrin, 308
U.S. at 138-39); see also Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
79. The Eighteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States
and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. Section 2.
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate leg-
islation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, §§ 1-2 (repealed 1933).
80. The Twenty-first Amendment states: "Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in viola-
tion of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2.
81. S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 732 (R.I. 1985) (citations omitted).
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and issues involving the Twenty-first Amendment all intertwine and appear
throughout commercial speech history.
California v. LaRue is often-cited authority for the argument that the powers
granted through the Twenty-first Amendment sometimes override protections
granted by the First Amendment.82 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
Court in which he refers to the Twenty-first Amendment as a "broad sweep" of
power which gives "something more than the normal state authority over public
health, welfare, and morals." Though addressing expressive speech rather than
commercial speech, the Court upheld a California regulation that prohibited bars
or nightclubs licensed to distribute liquor "from displaying either in the form of
movies or live entertainment, 'performances' that partake more of gross sexuality
than of communication."8 Holders of California liquor licenses brought an
action arguing that the regulation violated their First Amendment rights.8" The
Court held that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the State "broad authority" to
regulate the manner and places in which liquor was sold.86 Justice Rehnquist jus-
tified his holding by explaining that this regulation did not completely ban this
type of expressive conduct, but "[i]t... merely proscribed such performances in
establishments that it license[d] to sell liquor by the drink."
87
Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, though summarily
dismissed by the Supreme Court, is also often cited as authority for the argument
that the Twenty-first Amendment's broad powers sometimes override First
Amendment protections.' The petitioner violated three Ohio regulations when it
advertised the retail price and price advantage of alcoholic beverages in a circu-
lar that was not on the permitted premises. 9 The regulations were upheld against
petitioner's assertion that they violated the First Amendment.9 The court
explained the broad powers of the Twenty-first Amendment and said, "[t]he regu-
lation is directed toward regulation of the intoxicants themselves, rather than
speech. This is unlike the case, e.g., in Virginia Pharmacy ... where the speech
was the actual focus of the regulation, since the aim of the restriction was the
prevention of competition in pharmaceutical sales, not the discouragement of
pharmaceutical purchases."91
82. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 117-18.
85. Id. at 110.
86. Id. at 118.
87. Id.
88. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 433 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1982). In particular, the First
Circuit, in 44 Liquormart, Inc., relied on this case arguing that "it is settled that such action [summary dis-
missals] has precedential effect, although not necessarily on the identical reasoning of the court." 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 E3d 5, 8 (1994) (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)).
89. Queensgate, 433 N.E.2d at 139. See Omo ADM. CoDE § 4301:1-1-44 (1982).
90. Queensgate, 433 N.E.2d at 141-42.
91. Id. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm., Inc. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Though not in relation to alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court in Posadas
again addressed the "greater includes the lesser" rationale.92 The Court, after
declaring that the regulation passed the test set out in Central Hudson, said
it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of
the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less
intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions
on advertising .... Legislative regulation of products or activities deemed harmful,
such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, has varied from outright
prohibition on the one hand, to legalization of the product or activity with restric-
tions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand. 3
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court finally rejected the application of the
"greater includes the lesser" argument. 4 Coors brought action against the
Federal Alcohol Administration seeking judgment on the grounds that prohibit-
ing brewers from displaying alcohol content on beer labels violated the First
Amendment.9 5 When the Government, relying on Posadas, set forth an argument
that alcoholic beverages were "vice" products and that the greater power to pro-
hibit includes the lesser power to restrict their advertising, the Court rejected
their rationale.98 The Court held that Posadas did not compel the Court to craft
an exception to the Central Hudson standard. The Court explained that though it
concluded that the government could ban "advertising of casino gambling
because it could have prohibited gambling altogether," it did so only after "it
already had found that the state regulation survived the Central Hudson test."97
IV PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. District Court
44 Liquormart, Inc. and People's Super Liquor Stores brought their First
Amendment argument before the United States District Court of Rhode Island. 8
The district court recognized that the constitutionality of these same statutes was
addressed in two previous cases decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.9
The court pointed out that in both cases the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
92. Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
93. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
94. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 481, n.2. The government also relied on United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. In Edge
Broadcasting Co., petitioners sought judgment that regulations banning the advertising of gambling on radio
stations licensed in non-lottery states violated the First Amendment. The government asserted that gambling
was a "vice" activity and "that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban its advertisement." The Court in Edge Broadcasting refused to address the argument because the statues
were not unconstitutional under Central Hudson. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 (1993).
Responding to the government's reliance on Edge Broadcasting, the Court, in Rubin, said, "[i]ndeed, Edge
Broadcasting specifically avoided reaching the argument the government makes here because the Court found
that the regulation in question passed muster under Central Hudson." Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482, n.2.
97. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482, n.2.
98. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 E Supp. 543 (DR.I. 1993).
99. Id. at 549. See S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1985); Rhode Island Liquor
Stores Ass'n v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 497 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1985).
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that the advertising ban on prices was a "valid exercise of the State's powers
under the Twenty-first Amendment" and not in violation of the retailers' First
Amendment rights but noted that the holdings were merely persuasive authority
and not binding upon it.100
The district court accepted the parties' agreement to stipulate that "Rhode
Island has a substantial interest in fostering temperance and that under the
Twenty-first Amendment the State has the right to regulate 'the sale, and the inci-
dents thereof, of alcoholic beverages, and to protect its citizens from the evils
incident to alcohol.""'1 1 But, Rhode Island contended that the legislature's means
need only be "reasonably related to" rather than "directly advance" its substantial
interest in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.1"2 Rhode Island further con-
tended that "because of the Twenty-first Amendment, the price advertising regu-
lation is entitled to an 'added presumption' in favor of its validity."10 3 Rhode
Island argued "that this 'added presumption' works to shift the burden of proof to
the plaintiffs to show that 'these statutes are unconstitutional beyond a reason-
able doubt."'10 4
The district court found that Rhode Island's argument gave too much weight to
the Twenty-first Amendment.05 It held, "The Twenty-first Amendment is an
exception to the Commerce Clause and gives the states broad regulatory authori-
ty over interstate commerce of liquor."0 6 But, the court further held that the reg-
ulatory power was not absolute and did not necessarily override other constitu-
tional guaranties including those prescribed in the First Amendment. 7 The dis-
trict court did not find the cases Rhode Island relied on applicable and binding in
this case." 8 Accordingly the court found "the Twenty-first Amendment does not
100. 44 Liquor Mart, 829 E Supp. at 543. See Grantham v. Avondale Indus., 964 E2d 471 (5th Cir. 1992).
101. 44 Liquor Mart, 829 F. Supp at 551 (quoting Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 500
(10th Cir. 1983), rev d by Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981) (quoting California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)).
104. Id. (quoting Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum at 7). See S & S Liquor Mart, Inc., 497 A.2d at 729;
See also Evening Call, 497 A.2d at 331.
105. 44 Liquor Mart, 829 E Supp. at 551.
106. Id. at 552.
107. Id. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The majority per Justice Brennan said: "Once passing
beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitu-
tional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful. As one commentator has remarked: 'Neither the text nor the
history of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale or use of liquor is concerned."' Id. at 206 (quoting P. BREST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING, CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)).
108. Defendants based their argument on S & S Liquor Mart, Inc., 497 A.2d at 729 and Evening Call
Publishing Co., 497 A.2d at 331, which primarily relied on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, LaRue, 409
U.S. at 109, and Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 714. The district court said: "I do not find these cases persuasive in the
present context .... These cases concerned total bans on liquor and advertising. They simply do not deal with
price advertising in the present factual setting." 44 Liquor Mart, Inc., 829 E Supp. at 553. The district court
also did not find the summary dismissal in Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm 'n, 459 U.S. 807
(1983) strongly authoritative because of its different factual predicate and its lack of a reasoned opinion. Id.
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require a modification of either the level or allocation of the burden of proof in
commercial speech cases involving the regulation of the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages."
10 9
After refusing to base its judgment on the Twenty-first Amendment argument,
the district court applied the test set out in Central Hudson. The court accepted
the parties' agreement that the activity was lawful and not misleading and that
the State had a substantial interest in promoting temperance therefore satisfying
the first two prongs of Central Hudson.1" The court then focused on the last two
prongs of the test.'
To determine the relationship between the prohibition and the asserted end of
promoting temperance, the court extensively reviewed the evidence concerning
the effects of alcohol advertising on alcohol consumption." 2 It found a "pro-
nounced lack of unanimity among researches."' 1 3 The court concluded that the
State had failed to meet its burden of proof. It stated, "The State has simply not
shown an 'immediate connection' between the price advertising ban and reduced
consumption."" 4 Therefore, the third prong of Central Hudson was not met.
The court also held that the statutes failed to meet the fourth prong of Central
Hudson. It found "that the price advertising ban [was] more extensive than nec-
essary to serve the State's asserted interest.""' The Court set out alternative ways
to accomplish its goal without restricting speech. The court said
[C]ommon sense tells us that a lifting of the ban on price advertising will lead to
a more competitive market. But any concern that such competition will result in
unacceptably low liquor price levels can be controlled by the imposition of high-
er sales taxes or minimum consumer prices. Such measures would directly
serve the State's asserted ends without burdening commercial speech."
6
Finding that prongs three and four of the Central Hudson test were not met, the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island entered judgment
for the plaintiffs." 7 It concluded that Rhode Island's two statutes "impermissibly
restricte[d] commercial speech" and were therefore unconstitutional." '8
B. Court ofAppeals
Following declaratory judgment for the liquor retailers, the defendants
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The court of
109. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc., 829 F. Supp. at 553 (citing Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Attorney
General, 370 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986) (Twenty-first
Amendment does not require court to treat restraints on speech any differently than if alcoholic beverages were
not involved)).
110. Id. at 554. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Itt. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc., 829 F. Supp. at 554.
112. Id. at 546-49.
113. Id. at 546.
114. Id. at 554.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 555.
118. Id.
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appeals recognized that the retailers had sufficient standing to attack these
statutes."1 9 Rhode Island argued that
[t]he advertising ban directly advanced the governmental interest by increasing
the cost of alcoholic beverages, thereby lowering the amount of alcohol con-
sumption by residents of the State of Rhode Island .... [T]he State's power to
totally ban any advertising about alcoholic beverages necessarily included the
lesser power to restrict price advertising. Further, the State contended that
plaintiffs, in order to rely on the First Amendment, must "prove that the four
part Central Hudson test could not be met."12
The court began its analysis by applying the Central Hudson test.'21 As did the
district court, the court of appeals accepted the parties' agreement that prongs
one and two raised no question and moved forward to an analysis of the last two
prongs.'22 In its determination as to whether the advertising restriction "directly
advanced" the State's interest in promoting temperance, the court first dealt with
the burden of proof.'23 The court of appeals, agreeing with the lower court, held
that the burden is on the party seeking suppression, in this case the State, but it
did not agree with the level of proof required by the lower court.'24 The court of
appeals pointed out that the lower court demanded the State persuade the court
they were "correct."'25 The court of appeals, however, believed the burden to be
mere "reasonableness.' 26
The court of appeals held that the third prong of "directly advancing temper-
ance" was met.' 27 It relied on Posadas's lower standard- "[w]arrantable infer-
ences, however, may be sufficient."'' 28 Further, relying on LaRue, the court
relieved the State of some burden of proof by emphasizing an "added presump-
tion in favor of the validity of the [S]tate regulation in this area that the Twenty-
First Amendment requires.1 29
The court of appeals also did not agree with the lower court's analysis of the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. It held that the State was entitled to a
reasonable choice of methods to accomplish its goals and was not required to use
one of the means suggested by the lower court.'30 The court of appeals did not
believe the district court could find the State's means were unreasonable without
affirmative contradictions to rely on-especially with the added presumption
119. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F3d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1994). The court said, "[t]he State of Rhode
Island... did not ratify the Eighteenth Amendment, and was among the earliest to ratify the Twenty-[f]irst that
repealed it, in 1956." Id.
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id. at 6-8.
122. Id. at 6-7.





128. Id. Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986).
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granted by the Twenty-first Amendment.131 Noting that the plaintiffs did not
attempt to rebut the statute's declared purpose, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision and entered
judgment for Rhode Island. 32 44 Liquormart, Inc., and People's appealed their
constitutional question to the United States Supreme Court and certiorari was
granted.
V INSTANT CASE
In May of 1996, the Court unanimously held that Rhode Island's statutes pro-
hibiting the advertisement of alcohol prices violated the First Amendment and
were therefore unconstitutional. '33 Though all of the Justices concurred in the
judgment, there was far less unanimity in reasoning. Justice Stevens announced
the judgment of the Court and announced an opinion which was joined in parts
by various Justices. 34 Both Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote individual opin-
ions concurring in parts and concurring in the judgment.13 Justice O'Connor
also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment; Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer joined her opinion. '36
In parts one, two, and three, Justice Stevens discussed the procedural history,
facts, and the history of the applicable law. The rest of the opinion basically
addressed four areas: (1) Is Central Hudson still the appropriate test? (2) If the
Central Hudson test is used, how strict is its application? (3) Where does the
Court stand on various other arguments that have been introduced in prior com-
mercial speech cases and that were asserted by Rhode Island in this case? (4)
How does the Twenty-first Amendment affect the First Amendment?
A. Is Central Hudson the Appropriate Test?
1. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg
Justices Stevens, Thomas, Kennedy, and Ginsburg all seem to concur that the
Central Hudson test should not have been used in the present case and should
possibly be abandoned. The remaining Justices refused to decide this case so
broadly. Part four of Justice Stevens' opinion, which Justice Kennedy and
Justice Ginsburg joined, rejected Rhode Island's conclusion that the level of
scrutiny used during constitutional review should be the same for all commercial
speech.1 37 Justice Stevens suggested that commercial speech, which is not decep-
tive or misleading, should receive the same level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny) as
131. Id. at 7-8.
132. Id. at 8-9.
133. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996).
134. Id. at 1501-15.
135. Id. at 1515-20.
136. Id. at 1520-23.
137. Id. at 1507. See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
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non-commercial speech and not be subjected to the mid-level scrutiny set out in
Central Hudson.'38 Justice Stevens agreed that regulations directed at protecting
the consumer from misleading and deceptive advertisements deserve less than
strict review, but he did not agree that a lower level of scrutiny should be used for
commercial speech that is not deceptive or misleading. '39 He wrote: "[W]hen a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands."'""
Justice Stevens noted that a lesser level of scrutiny for truthful and non-mis-
leading commercial speech is even more unjustified and in danger of violating
the First Amendment when the regulation amounts to a complete ban.' This is
because, unlike content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, complete
bans deny alternative means for the message to be portrayed.4 2 Justice Stevens
contended that the dangers involved when regulations amount to "complete bans
on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech cannot be explained away by
appeals to the 'commonsense distinctions' that exist between commercial and
noncommercial speech. . . .[N]either the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater
hardiness' of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its
complete suppression with added deference." '43
Justice Stevens pointed out that the reason commercial speech has obtained a
lesser level of scrutiny than non-commercial speech is to protect consumers from
"commercial harms."' He explained that regulations amounting to complete
bans on truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech are rarely directed at pro-
tecting consumers from such harms but "rest solely on the offensive assumption
that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth."'45 Justice Stevens' estab-
lished belief is that, as a general rule, the speaker and the audience should deter-
mine the value that should be given to speech, not the government.'46 He main-
tained that truthful and non-misleading information should not lose its First
Amendment protections simply because it proposes a commercial transaction.' 7
2. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia, in his separate opinion, sympathized with Justice Stevens' con-
cerns about "paternalistic governmental polices that prevent men and women
from hearing facts that might not be good for them."" But, he said, "On the
other hand, it would also be paternalism for [the Court] to prevent the people of





143. Id. at 1507-08 (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 1508 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,426 (1993)).
145. Id. at 1508 (citing Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)).
146. Id. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
147. 44 Liquormart, Inc. 116 S. Ct. at 1507.
148. Id. at 1515.
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the States from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we have good
reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them."1"9 Justice Scalia
agreed with Justice Stevens that these statutes did not pass the test set out in
Central Hudson, but he did not agree that the Court had the authority at this time
to overrule Central Hudson.5 0 Justice Scalia believed that the Court should look
to the "state legislative practices at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted" for guidance on how commercial speech should be treated under the
First Amendment.151
3. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Souter and
Breyer, expressed some of the same concerns as Justice Scalia. Justice
O'Connor said she would have "resolved this case more narrowly."'5 2 Because
Rhode Island's statutes would not pass Central Hudson, Justice O'Connor did




Though Justice Thomas did not join in part four of Justice Stevens' opinion, he
too did not believe that the test set out in Central Hudson should be applied. 5
He pointed out what he saw as inconsistencies in the Court's decisions. Justice
Thomas said that after Virginia Pharmacy, some members of the Court "contin-
ued to stress the importance of free dissemination of information about commer-
cial choices in a market economy; [and] the antipaternalistic premises of the First
Amendment," but at other times the Court "appeared to accept the legitimacy of
laws that suppress information in order to manipulate the choices of con-
sumers-so long as the government could show that the manipulation was in fact
successful."'55 Justice Thomas, apparently in agreement with Justice Stevens,
further asserted that commercial speech should not receive a lesser level of
scrutiny than noncommercial speech and that reasons given in past cases for




152. Id. at 1521.
153. Id. at 1520-22.
154. Id. at 1515-16.
155. Id. at 1517.
156. Id. at 1518. Thomas recalled the interests set out in Central Hudson. He said, "The asserted rationales
for differentiating 'commercial' speech from other speech are (1) that the truth of 'commercial' speech is sup-
posedly more verifiable, and (2) that 'commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest' is supposedly
a 'hardy breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulations."' Id.
at 1518 n.4 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[VOL. 18:221
THE FUTURE OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
B. Application of Central Hudson
1. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg
Though Justice Stevens suggested in part four that truthful and nonmisleading,
commercial speech should receive ordinary, noncommercial speech First
Amendment scrutiny and protection, he nevertheless proceeded in part five of
his opinion to apply the test set out in Central Hudson."7 Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined this part of his opinion. Justice Stevens found that
the statutes, in compliance with prong one of the Central Hudson test, constitut-
ed a ban against "truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product," and he
then applied the remaining three prongs." 8
Rhode Island argued that the statutes pass prongs two and four of the Central
Hudson test because they serve a "substantial interest in promoting temperance,
and because it is no more extensive than necessary" to serve this interest." 9
Justice Stevens maintained that the ban "may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.""1 " He further con-
tended that "the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation
will advance its interest, but also that it will do so 'to a material degree.' 1 1
Justice Stevens held that without evidentiary proof we could assume (1) the pro-
hibition tends to alleviate competition, therefore keeping prices higher; and
(2) consumption is lower when prices are higher; but he held that without such
proof we could not conclude that the regulation will advance its interest to a
"material degree." '62 Such a conclusion, he suggests, would require "specula-
tion" and "conjecture" on the part of the Court." So, while Justice Stevens did
not declare Rhode Island had no "substantial interest" in promoting temperance
in compliance with the second prong of Central Hudson, he refused to find that
the statutes "directly advanced" (third prong) the interest without a finding that
such advancement was of a "material degree."'6 "
Justice Stevens also determined that the State did not meet the forth prong
requirement that its advertisement prohibition be "no more extensive than neces-
sary" to reach its goal. 6 ' Justice Stevens said the State "failed to establish a 'rea-
sonable fit' between its abridgment of speech and its temperance goal.' 66 Justice
Stevens concluded this section by pointing out that the prohibitions cannot sur-
vive even under Central Hudson's "less than strict standard that generally applies
in commercial speech cases.""1 7
157. Id. at 1508-10. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
158. 44 Liquormart, Inc. 116 S. Ct. at 1508. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
159. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1508-09.
160. Id. at 1509.
161. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993); See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 485 (1995).
162. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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2. Justices Scalia and Thomas
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the statutes did not pass the
Central Hudson test and did not provide any analysis for this conclusion. Justice
Thomas, also in a separate opinion, concurred with this "stricter" application of
Central Hudson. In particular, Justice Thomas commented on the Court's appli-
cation of the fourth prong of Central Hudson and Justice Stevens' application of
it in this case. He said, "[F]aulting the State for failing to show that its price
advertising ban decreases alcohol consumption 'significantly,' . . . seems to
imply that if the State had been more successful at keeping consumers ignorant
and thereby decreasing their consumption, then the restriction might have been
upheld."1 He said that this strict application of prong four commits the Court to
strike down all regulations that effect speech when other regulations would be at
least as effective." 9 Justice Thomas asserted that he did not mind this application
so much because he believes that it inevitably leads the Court back to the doc-
trine of Virginia Pharmacy-- which is exactly the direction he would like to see
the Court turn.
3. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and Breyer
joining, also accepted that the statutes did not pass the First Amendment analysis
of Central Hudson. Justice O'Connor focused her opinion on the fourth prong.170
She said that even if we assume that all of the prongs except the fourth were met,
the regulations could not pass prong four."' She said, "The availability of less
burdensome alternatives to reach the stated goal signals that the fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends may be too
imprecise to withstand First Amendment scrutiny."7 2 She recognized a looser
application of prong four was applied in Posadas, but she pointed out that, after
Posadas, the Court has required a "closer look" at "the State's professed goal. 173
C. "Legislative Deference," "Lesser Includes the Greater," and "Vice Products"
In part six, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, responded to three arguments asserted by Rhode Island. 174 The Court
had been confronted with these arguments in prior cases and again attempted to
put them to rest. Rhode Island first argued, "because expert opinions as to the
effectiveness of the price advertising ban 'go both ways,' the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that the ban constituted a 'reasonable choice' by the legisla-
ture.11 71 Justice Stevens rejected the State's first argument. '76 He found that the
168. Id. at 1518.
169. Id. at 1519.
170. Id. at 1521-22.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1521.
173. Id. at 1522.
174. Id. at 1510-14.
175. Id. at 151 l(citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7 (1994)); Cf Trustees of the State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) ("reasonable fit").
176. 44 Liquormart, Inc. 116 S. Ct. at 1511.
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State's reliance on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co. was erroneous. '77 Justice Stevens pointed out how that deci-
sion was directed at a statute that regulated advertising of illegal activity where
this advertising ban is directed at information pertaining to lawful activity. 78
Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's reliance on Posadas, which held that it
was left to the legislature to decide on the proper means to reach their goals,
more persuasive;179 however, he did not agree with Rhode Island. Instead, he
held that Posadas had "erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis."18
Justice Stevens concluded by saying, "[A] state legislature does not have the
broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes that the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate. '" '18
Second, Rhode Island argued that "precedent requires [the Court] to give par-
ticular deference to that legislative choice because the State could, if it chose,
ban the sale of alcoholic beverages outright." '82 Justice Stevens also refused to
accept this argument. 83 He noted that again Rhode Island relied on the Court's
findings in Posadas where the majority held that "the greater power to complete-
ly ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising
of casino gambling."84 Based on this statement, Rhode Island concluded that
"its undisputed authority to ban alcoholic beverages must include the power to
restrict advertisements offering them for sale." ' Justice Stevens rejected this
syllogism as applied to complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech. Justice Stevens said, "Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, we
think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive
than banning conduct."
86
Third, Rhode Island argued, "Deference is appropriate because alcoholic bever-
ages are so-called 'vice' products." '87 Justice Stevens also rejected this argu-
ment. 88 He found that the State erroneously relied on Edge.189 He recalled that
177. Id. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
178. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1511; Edge, 509 U.S. at 433-35.
179. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1511. See Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of PR., 478 U.S.
328, 344 (1986).
180. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1511. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 44 Liquornart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1511.
182. Id. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
183. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1512-13.
184. Id. at 1512; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
185. 44Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1512.
186. Id. Stevens footnoted the proverb: "Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish,
and you feed him for a lifetime." Id. at 1512, n. 19 (quoting THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 646
(compiled by R. Tripp 1970)). He said, "[it may prove more injurious to prevent people from teaching others
how to fish than to prevent fish from being sold. Similarly, a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may cur-
tail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycles riding within city limits. In short we reject the assump-
tion that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow proves that the power to
prohibit an activity is necessarily 'greater' than the power to suppress speech about it?' Id. at 1512.
187. Id. at 1511. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
188. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
189. Id. at 1513. See Edge, 509 U.S. at 418.
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in Rubin the Court struck down this very argument. 90 Rejecting this argument,
Justice Stevens said that "recognition of such an exception would also have the
unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify censorship
by the simple expedient of placing the 'vice' label on selected lawful activities,
or requiring the federal courts to establish a federal common law of vice." 91
D. The Twenty-first Amendment and its Relation to the First Amendment
In part seven of Justice Stevens' opinion, he wrote for the entire Court and held
that Rhode Island's liquor price advertising ban could not be saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment.92 He acknowledged that both the State 93 and the
court of appeals relied on the Court's statement in LaRue that "the Twenty-first
Amendment required that the prohibition be given an added presumption in favor
of its validity."' 4 However, as the Court established more recently in Rubin,
"LaRue did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead concerned
the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol was served.
195
Accordingly, the Court put this argument to rest and held, "[T]he Twenty-first
Amendment does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridg-
ing the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment." 9' Agreeing with
Justice Stevens' analysis in that regard, Justice O'Connor wrote: "The Twenty-
first Amendment does not trump First Amendment rights or add a presumption
of validity to a regulation that cannot otherwise satisfy First Amendment require-
ments.""9 7
VI. ANALYSIS
Though the Supreme Court's judgment in 44 Liquormart, Inc. was unanimous,
the majority did not concur in a single line of reasoning. The Court left impor-
tant questions to be answered. The uncertainty that remains creates fear in many
about the status of the increasingly popular bans on cigarette advertising.
The use of cigarettes and other tobacco products by minors and the health risks
related to such use have led state legislatures, Congress, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the President in search for means to discourage the use of
tobacco products. Restricting the advertising of such products has been a pre-
190. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1513. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
191. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1513.
192. Id. at 1515.
193. Stevens wrote in a footnote, "The State also relies on two per curia opinions that followed the 21st
Amendment analysis set forth in LaRue." Id. at 1514 (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S.
714 (1981), and Newport v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986)).
194. Id. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1973).
195. Id. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 483, n.2.
196. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1515.
197. Id. at 1523.
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dominant route to accomplishing their goal.19 The Supreme Court has not
addressed these bans under its current commercial speech analysis.199 Perhaps
the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to further stabilize commercial
speech law through an analysis of these growing bans on cigarette advertising.
After the Supreme Court's opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc.,"' what is most
uncertain is whether the entire Court will return to the basic analysis of Virginia
Pharmacy."' Will the Court conclude that once it has determined that the com-
mercial speech in question is truthful, nomnisleading, and concerns lawful activi-
ty that the speech will receive full First Amendment protection-the regulation
must pass strict scrutiny to survive?. 2 It appears that Justices Stevens, Thomas,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg are ready to embrace this analysis." 3 And, while the
remaining five Justices did not find it necessary to adopt that standard in this
case, they did not rule out the possibility of its adoption in future cases. If the
Court was to adopt this standard, all bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech that concerned lawful activity would have to pass strict scrutiny in order
to be upheld; theoretically, even bans on certain cigarette advertising.
Though the Court left undecided if a majority will eventually overturn Central
Hudson. 4 and return to the standards of Virginia Pharmacy,"' the Supreme
Court's 44 Liquormart, Inc. opinion does provide some firm guidance in other
areas."' For instance, it is clear that the Court is no longer going to accept the
"vice" products or conduct argument, the "greater includes the lesser" rationale,
or the assertion that a state has "broad discretion to suppress truthful, non-mis-
leading information for paternalistic purposes.""2 7 Furthermore, though a majori-
ty was not willing to overturn Central Hudson on the facts of 44 Liquormart,
Inc., it appears a unanimous Court will apply a "stricter" application of Central
Hudson, rather than the deferential analysis employed by the Court in Posadas."'
Prongs one and two of Central Hudson's test have been applied fairly consis-
tently throughout commercial speech cases. There has been some variation on
198. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L . No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)) (making it unlawful to "advertise cigarettes... on any medium of electronic
communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission); Baltimore City Code,
Art. 30 (zoning),§ 10.0-1(I)(1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804,
897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995) (restricting the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts to protect children and adolescents); Tobacco Products Control Act of 1995, S. 1262, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (attempting to restrict advertising on all billboards in close proximity to elementary and secondary
schools, print ads in publications where subscribers under the age of 18 make up more than 15% of the total
subscribers, and in family amusement centers). See also Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 2414,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Freedom From Nicotine Addiction Act of 1995, H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995). See generally Daniel Helberg, supra note 35.
199. The Supreme Court upheld the ban of cigarette advertising on radio and television in Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, but this decision was made before Central Hudson was decided. Capital Broad.
Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
200. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
201. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
202. Id.
203. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1495.
204. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
205. Virginia Pharm., 425 U.S. 748.
206. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1495.
207. Id. at 1511.
208. Id.
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the application of prong three, but most of the discrepancies in applying Central
Hudson appear in prong four. The prong three standard started off in Central
Hudson to be that the regulation was required to "directly advance" the state's
asserted "substantial interest."2 9 Though the Court in Posadas used this same
terminology, its application was less stringent. It did not focus on evidence for
proof that the prong was satisfied, but rather found it sufficient that the legisla-
tures believed the regulation would advance their interest.210 This is the same
reasoning used by the First Circuit in 44 Liquormart, Inc.211 The court refused to
follow the logic of the lower court who analyzed statistical evidence concerning
the effect of the regulation on the governmental interest and instead concluded
that "warrantable inferences" were sufficient to determine that the interest was
advanced.212 The Supreme Court rejected this application of the third prong and
added that the regulation must not merely "directly advance" the government's
interest but must do so in a "material way.
213
The fourth prong of Central Hudson has fluctuated more dramatically than any
of the other prongs and was given the most attention by the Justices in the
Supreme Court's 44 Liquormart, Inc. opinion. Central Hudson's fourth prong
originally required that the regulation be "no more extensive than necessary" to
accomplish its goal.214 Justice Rehnquist, in Posadas, weakened this prong by
allowing legislatures to have a choice between means to accomplish their goal,
regardless of the effects on speech.25 Again, the First Circuit in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. followed the reasoning of the Court in Posadas and allowed legislatures a
"reasonable choice" of methods to satisfy their interests. 2"5 The Supreme Court
once more rejected the reasoning used in Posadas and by the First Circuit. It
again required a showing that the regulation was "no more extensive than neces-
sary" to accomplish its goal.217
So, while it is unclear if the Central Hudson test will be the commercial speech
standard in cases to come, it is at least certain that a majority will require the rig-
orous application used in 44 Liquormart, Inc. Such a strict application should
prove to strike down many bans on commercial speech. States must meet high
standards before any ban on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech will be
upheld--especially when it amounts to a "complete ban." With such a high bur-
den, it seems a loophole or an exception will have to be created in order for some
of the present cigarette advertising bans to pass First Amendment scrutiny-
unless the standard is ignored.
209. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
210. Posadas De P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 335-36 (1986).
211. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 E3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
212. Id.
213. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508-09 (1996).
214. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
215. Posadas De PR. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-44 (1986).
216. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 39 E3d at 7.
217. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
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Recently, the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to strike down a ban on ciga-
rette advertising but declined.218 In refusing to do so, the Fourth Circuit did not
create a loophole nor an exception but, instead, seemingly ignored issues decided
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. involving the standards required by the Central Hudson
test.219
The Fourth Circuit delivered its opinion in Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Mayor of Baltimore, on August 31, 1995, more than eight months before the
Supreme Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.22 ° It was faced with
the decision of whether Baltimore, Maryland Ordinance 307 violated the First
Amendment.221 The ordinance prohibited "the placement of any sign that 'adver-
tise[d] cigarettes in a publicly visible location,' i.e., on 'outdoor billboards, sides
of building[s], and freestanding signboards."'222 To arrive at its decision, the
Fourth Circuit applied the test set out in Central Hudson.223
In its application, the court skipped over the first prong and went right into its
discussion of the second prong of "substantial government interest." '224 The gov-
ernment's asserted interest was "to promote compliance with the state prohibition
of the sale of cigarettes to minors."22 The court also recognized that the district
court found that "the ordinance also furthers the obvious public policy underly-
ing such a prohibition, 'which is to prevent the purchase, and thus the consump-
tion, of cigarettes by minors."'226 The court found that this was a substantial pub-
lic interest and moved on to its analysis under the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson.227
The court did not do an independent analysis of the last two prongs.228 Instead,
it referred to its analysis in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke.22 s The ordinance in
218. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 E3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
219. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1495.
220. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995); 44 Liquornart, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1495.
221. Penn Adver., 63 E3d at1320-21; Baltimore City Code, Art. 30 (zoning), § 10.0-1(I). The court was also
faced with the issue of whether Ordinance 307 was "preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act or by Maryland statutes prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors or the possession of ciga-
rettes by minors." Id. Ultimately, the court found that the Ordinance was not preempted by either. Id. at 1324.
222. Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1321 (alterations in original). The ordinance in question, Ordinance 307, in rele-
vant part provides: "No person may place any sign, poster, placard, device, graphic display, or other form of
advertising that advertises cigarettes in a publicly visible location. In this section 'publicly visible location'
includes outdoor billboards, sides of building[s], and free standing signboards." Id. at 1321, n. 1 (alterations in
original) (citing Baltimore City Code, Art. 30 (zoning), § 10.0-1(1)).
223. Id. at 1325-26; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
224. Penn Adver, 63 E3d at 1325. The Fourth Circuit does address prong one in its opinion of Anheuser-
Busch after remand from the Supreme Court with direction to be decided in compliance with 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 E3d 325, 329 (4th Cir.
1996). It said, "Baltimore's ordinance expressly targets persons who cannot be legal users of alcoholic bever-
ages, not legal users as in Rhode Island." Id.
225. Penn Adver., 63 F.3dat 1325.
226. Id. (quoting Penn Advert. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Md.
1994)).
227. Id.
228. See Id. at 1325-26.
229. Id. at 1325; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 E3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Anheuser-Busch similarly prohibited "the placement of stationary, outdoor
'advertising that advertises alcoholic beverages' in certain areas of [Baltimore]
City."23 In analyzing prong three of Central Hudson, the court found:
There is a logical nexus between the City's objective and the means it selected
for achieving that objective, and it is not necessary, in satisfying Central
Hudson's third prong, to prove conclusively that the correlation in fact exists, or
that the steps undertaken will solve the problem .... The proper standard for
approval must involve an assessment of the reasonableness of the legislature's
belief that the means it selected will advance its ends.231
So the Fourth Circuit, loosely applying Central Hudson, found that the third
prong was satisfied. Referring to its Anheuser-Busch analysis to determine the
fourth prong-is the regulation "more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest,"2 32-the court concluded that when faced with a "problem as significant
as that which the City seeks to address, the City must be given some reasonable
latitude,"-satisfying prong four.2"
Upon appeal of the Fourth Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court of the United
States vacated the decision and remanded both Penn Advertising234 and Anheuser-
Bush2 31 to be reconsidered in light of its opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc.2 31 On
remand of Penn Advertising,2 37 the Fourth Circuit affirmed its prior holding with-
out a full opinion but referred to modifications in its opinion of Anheuser-Bush
2 38
on remand.
In an attempt to justify its decision to uphold the advertising regulation, the
Fourth Circuit did not change its application of Central Hudson but rather point-
ed out what it recognized as differences between Baltimore's restrictions and the
restrictions in 44 Liquormart, Inc.2 39 The first difference the Fourth Circuit
found was that Rhode Island's regulation constituted a "blanket ban" on price
advertising while Baltimore's regulation was not a "ban," but "zoning.""24 The
second difference between the two cases the court focused on was that Rhode
Island's regulation sought "to enforce adult temperance through an artificial bud-
getary constraint, [while] Baltimore's interest is to protect children who are not
yet independently able to assess the value of the message presented." '241
230. Anheuser-Busch, 63 E3d at 1308.
231. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63
E3d at 1314)(emphasis added).
232. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
233. Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 E3d at 1316)(emphasis added).
234. Id.
235. Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d 1305.
236. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
237. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
238. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 E3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 329. The court then discussed how the Supreme Court has observed special protections under the
First Amendment where children are involved and cites a string of cases. Id. What the Fourth Circuit fails to
realize is that these cases address either unprotected speech (obscenity and child pornography) or speech that
has been given a different level of review (broadcast media) and not restrictions on truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech. Id. e.g.
[VOL. 18:221
THE FUTURE OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
Clearly an advertising ban like the one in Penn Advertising would not pass
First Amendment scrutiny if the Supreme Court were to return to the rigorous
standards of Virginia Pharmacy.242 All that would have to be determined under
such standards is that the advertisement was truthful, nonmisleading, and con-
cerned lawful activity.24 While use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco by
minors is unlawful, there is no indication that only advertisements portraying
minors using such products were prohibited; but, rather, lawful portrayals were
prohibited because they were displayed in areas in plain view of children.
2 4
Unless the standard was changed to include lawful activity "appropriate" for
view by children, such a restriction would be struck down. Consequently, such a
change in this standard would bring back in the voice of paternalism and the
"vice" argument which the Court explicitly attempted to get away from in 44
Liquormart, Inc.
245
While cigarette advertisements like the ones in Penn Advertising do not portray
the use of tobacco by minors which is unlawful, there is an argument that these
truthful advertisements could be misleading as to children. Since child con-
sumption is illegal, it might be that stricter standards are applied to the advertise-
ment of products and activities in which legality depends upon age so as to avoid
misleading children. Such an argument might have the affect of altering the
types of advertisements portrayed but should not rise to the level of banning all
advertisements of such products and activities. This is one direction the Court
could turn if it were to rely on the rigorous standards of Virginia Pharmacy,
2 4
but it still appears the advertising bans would not pass.
Even if the Court retains its renewed Central Hudson analysis,247 it is likely
advertising restrictions such as the one in Penn Advertising2 48 would not be
upheld by the Supreme Court. Though the Fourth Circuit claimed to use the
Central Hudson test in compliance with its application in 44 Liquormart, Inc., it
differed dramatically in its standards.249 First, in its application of the third prong
of Central Hudson, the Supreme Court required a finding that the means
employed by the legislatures "directly advanced" the state's asserted interest to a
"material degree";.. the Fourth Circuit held that a "logical nexus" between the
legislature's means and its asserted interest was sufficient.2 51 Secondly, in its
application of the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the Supreme Court required a
finding that the regulation be "no more extensive than necessary" to serve the
asserted substantial interest.252 The Fourth Circuit held that the legislature had
"reasonable latitude" to choose the manner in which to accomplish its goal.2 53
242. Virginia State Bd. ofPharm. v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
243. Id.
244. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 E3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
245. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
246. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
247. Id.
248. Penn Adver, 101 F.3d at 332.
249. Id.
250. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
251. Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 E3d 1305, 1314 (4th Cir. 1995)).
252. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
253. Penn Adver., 63 E3d at 1325-26 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 F3d at 1316).
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The application used by the Fourth Circuit directly ignored the Supreme Court's
standards for First Amendment scrutiny and corrections to the First Circuit's rea-
soning in 44 Liquormart, Inc.2"4
The Fourth Circuit's variation from the Supreme Court's holding in 44
Liquormart, Inc., may merely show their reluctance to strike down these increas-
ingly popular cigarette advertising bans."' Unable to uphold these bans under
the Court's strict analysis, the Fourth Circuit was forced to loosen the require-
ments or allow the advertising.256 What the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated is
that if the Supreme Court wants to comply with the efforts of state legislatures,
Congress, the Food and Drug Administration, and the President by using bans on
advertising to deter the use of tobacco products by minors, it is going to have to
find a new route. The Supreme Court is not going to be able to make these bans
"fit" within its strict commercial speech guidelines. The Supreme Court will
have to find an exception for cigarettes and other tobacco products if it seeks to
use advertising to deter their use.
254. 44 Liquormart, Inc. 116 S. Ct. 1495.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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